

SECRET

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 2/7

COMMITTEE ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE (COMOR)

(Effective 9 August 1960)

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6, and for the purpose of providing a focal point for information on, and for the coordinated development of foreign-intelligence¹ requirements for, overhead reconnaissance projects and activities of the Government over denied areas² (including foreign-intelligence requirements during research and development phases of such projects and activities) a Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) of the U.S. Intelligence Board is hereby established.

1. For the purposes of this directive the term "overhead reconnaissance" includes all reconnaissance for foreign-intelligence purposes by satellite, or by any vehicle over denied areas, whether by photographic, ELINT, COMINT, INFRARED, RADINT or other means, but does not include reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct support of actively combatant forces.

2. The Committee shall coordinate the adaptation of priority foreign-intelligence objectives and requirements established by USIB, members of USIB, or other committees of USIB, to the capabilities of existing and potential overhead reconnaissance systems; and shall examine and make recommendations, as appropriate, on such related matters as dissemination and any special security controls required, but shall not undertake to provide operational guidance. (As pertains to COMINT, such special security controls shall not be less restrictive than those prescribed by COMINT regulations.)

3. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) shall be composed of designated representatives of Intelligence Board departments and agencies. Representatives of other agencies may be invited by the Chairman to participate in selected discussions as agreed by the Committee.

4. The Chairman of the Committee shall be designated by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with and with the concurrence of the Intelligence Board.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

¹ As distinguished from operational "early warning" information and other operational-support intelligence.

² For purposes of this directive "denied areas" include all territory and territorial waters claimed by members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, as well as such other areas of priority intelligence interest as may be determined by USIB.

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